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Thread: Ukraine outrage and analysis.

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    Default Re: Ukraine outrage and analysis.

    Best to compare the Pentagon's assessment, from the NY Times, above, with yesterday's, ISW. Of course, ISW probably takes some account of what the Pentagon says, but they will post their references. You can see where they found their items.

    May 1, 6:15 ET

    Russian forces are setting conditions to establish permanent control over the areas of southern Ukraine they currently occupy, either as nominally independent “People’s Republics” or by annexing them to Russia. Russian sources reported that stores in occupied Melitopol and Volnovakha are beginning to transition to using the Russian ruble.[1] British Defense Intelligence reported that the ruble will be used in Kherson City starting on May 1 as part of a 4-month currency transition scheme enacted by the occupation administration.[2] These measures, which are not necessary or normal in military occupation administrations, indicate that Russian President Vladimir Putin likely intends to retain control over these areas and that his ambitions are not confined to Donbas.

    Western and Ukrainian sources claimed that Russian President Vladimir Putin may announce a “general mobilization” of the Russian military on May 9th. British Defense Minister Ben Wallace claimed that Putin may make this announcement, although Wallace admitted this was a personal opinion and not based on intelligence.[3] Advisor to the Ukrainian President Mikhail Podolyak amplified Wallace’s claims and stated that a general mobilization on May 9 would be consistent with the economic imperatives faced by Russia as a result of the invasion of Ukraine.[4] ISW has no independent verification of these claims, which would not in any event generate large numbers of usable soldiers for many months.

    The Kremlin likely seeks to leverage its partners in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) to evade Western sanctions. The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that Russia is courting CSTO members to procure input goods and materials for dual-use technologies that Russia cannot directly purchase due to Western sanctions.[5] The GUR stated that this effort will increase CSTO members’ economic dependence on Russia and enable Russian sanction evasion by using third-party countries to re-export Russian products to international markets.[6] The GUR stated that the Russian Ulyanovsk Mechanical Plant is attempting to obtain German components needed for the production of Buk surface-to-air missile systems and Tunguska missiles via Kazakhstan. Western sanctions may need to target Russia’s partners in the CSTO and Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) customs union to prevent Russian sanctions evasion.

    Key Takeaways

    - Russian occupying forces are setting conditions to allow Russia to permanently govern occupied areas in southern Ukraine, not just in Donbas.
    - Ukrainian forces likely conducted a rocket artillery strike on a Russian command post in Izyum on April 30 that struck after Russian Chief of Staff Valery Gerasimov had left but killed other senior Russian officers.
    - Russian forces continue to make incremental advances moving southwestward in the direction of Lyman but are largely stalled against Ukrainian positions on the pre-February 24 frontline.
    - Russian forces continued re-grouping and reconnaissance on the Southern Axis and did not make any confirmed advances.
    https://www.understandingwar.org/bac...sessment-may-1

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    Default Re: Ukraine outrage and analysis.

    This article has diagrams of the Russian T-72, the US Abrams, and the German Leopard tanks. The diagrams show quickly the design flaw that the articles talks about.

    How the ‘jack-in-the-box’ flaw dooms some Russian tanks

    By Sammy Westfall and William Neff
    April 30, 2022|Updated April 30, 2022 at 6:09 p.m. EDT

    A destroyed Russian T-72 tank in Ukraine's Kyiv region on April 1. (Oleksandr Klymenko/Reuters)

    The sight of Russian tank turrets, blown off and lying in ruin along Ukrainian roads, points to a tank design issue known as the “jack-in-the-box” flaw.

    The fault is related to the way many Russian tanks hold and load ammunition. In these tanks, including the T-72, the Soviet-designed vehicle that has seen wide use in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, shells are all placed in a ring within the turret. When an enemy shot hits the right spot, the ring of ammunition can quickly “cook off” and ignite a chain reaction, blasting the turret off the tank’s hull in a lethal blow.

    Are you on Telegram? Subscribe to our channel for the latest updates on Russia's war in Ukraine.

    Sitting on a powder keg: The T-72 tank’s fatal flaw

    Other tanks on the modern battlefield generally store their ammunition away from the crew, behind armored walls. The Russian T-72 main battle tank’s ammunition sits in a carousel-style automatic loader directly beneath the main turret and members of the crew.

    T-72 (Russia, Ukraine)

    Tank commander

    Gunner

    Driver

    If a penetrating hit on the tank’s relatively thin side armor detonates one of these rounds, the explosion can set off
    a chain reaction, killing the crew and destroying the tank.

    Leopard 2 (Germany)

    M1 Abrams (United States)

    Sources: “M1 Abrams vs. T-72 Ural” by Stephen Zaloga (Osprey Publishing, 2009); “Leopard 2 Main Battle Tank 1979–1998”

    by Uwe Schnellbacher and Michael Jerchel (Osprey Publishing, 1998); Federation of American Scientists

    WILLIAM NEFF/THE WASHINGTON POST

    In Ukraine, destroyed Russian tanks are the newest roadside attraction

    “For a Russian crew, if the ammo storage compartment is hit, everyone is dead,” said Robert E. Hamilton, a professor at the U.S. Army War College, adding that the force of the explosion can “instantaneously vaporize” the crew. “All those rounds — around 40 depending on if they’re carrying a full load or not — are all going to cook off, and everyone is going to be dead.”

    British Defense Secretary Ben Wallace this week estimated that Russia has lost at least 530 tanks — destroyed or captured — since it invaded Ukraine in February.

    What to know about the role Javelin antitank missiles could play in Ukraine’s fight against Russia

    “What we are witnessing now is Ukrainians taking advantage of the tank flaw,” said Samuel Bendett, an adviser at the Center for Naval Analyses, a federally funded nonprofit research institute. Ukraine’s Western allies have provided antitank weapons at high volume.

    Ukraine, too, has been using Russian-made T-72 variants, which face the same issue. But Russia’s invasion has relied on the large-scale deployment of tanks, and Ukraine has been able to fight back better than expected.

    The flaw speaks to a broader difference in approaches between Western militaries and Russia’s, analysts say.

    “American tanks for a long time have prioritized crew survivability in a way that Russian tanks just haven’t,” said Hamilton. “It’s really just a difference in the design of the ammo storage compartment and a difference in prioritization.”

    Ammunition in most Western tanks can be kept under the turret floor, protected by the heavy hull — or in the back of the turret, said Hamilton. While a turret-placed ammunition storage compartment is potentially vulnerable to a hit, built-in features can prevent the same level of decapitating devastation seen in the case of the T-72.

    Even the early versions of the American M1 Abrams tanks in the 1980s were fitted with tough blast doors separating the crew inside from the stored ammunition. These tanks have a crew of four, including a loader who opens the ballistic door manually. These were designed to be stronger than the top armor, so that if ammunition is cooked off, the explosion would be channeled upward through blowout panels, rather than into the crew compartment, Hamilton said.

    On the other hand, Russian tanks rely on mechanical automatic loaders, allowing them to be manned by a team of three.

    The design of Russian tanks prioritizes rate of fire, firepower, a low profile, speed and maneuverability vs. overall survivability, said Hamilton. Russian tanks tend to be lighter and simpler, and have thinner, less-advanced armor than Western tanks. The design vulnerability was probably “just cheaper and lighter,” Hamilton said.

    Newer Russian models have come out since the T-72, which was produced in the 1970s by the Soviet Union. One of them, the T-14 Armata, has been described as a sophisticated battlefield game-changer since it debuted at a 2015 military parade. But the Armatas have not yet seen much use outside parades. Newer variants of the T-72 have come with greater tank protections, Bendett said, but the prevailing principle has been the same: a three-person crew with a lower profile, and shells in a circle within the turret.

    Javelins, not jets: How the U.S. is arming Ukraine against Russia
    Washington Post Pentagon and national security reporter Karoun Demirjian explains the difficulties of deciding which weapons to send Ukraine. (Video: Joshua Carroll/The Washington Post)
    Understanding the weapons that have drawn the world’s attention since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine

    For the U.S. military, Hamilton said, “if the tank is destroyed and the crew survives, you can make another tank more quickly than you can train another crew.”

    For Russia, “the people are as expendable as the machine,” he said. “The Russians have known about this for 31 years — you have to say they’ve just chosen not to deal with it.”

    Claire Parker contributed to this report.
    https://www.washingtonpost.com/world...ck-in-the-box/

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    Default Re: Ukraine outrage and analysis.

    Kateryna Stepanenko, Karolina Hird, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan

    May 3, 6:45 pm ET

    Ukrainian officials reported with increasing confidence that the Kremlin will announce mobilization on May 9. Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate Chief Kyrylo Budanov said on May 2 that the Kremlin has begun to prepare mobilization processes and personnel ahead of the expected May 9 announcement and has already carried out covert mobilization.[1] Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council said that high-ranking Russian officials are trying to legitimize a prolonged war effort as the Third World War against the West, rather than the "special military operation” against Ukraine, as Russian President Vladimir Putin has hitherto framed Russia’s invasion.[2] ISW has no independent confirmation of Russian preparations for mobilization.

    A significant Ukrainian counteroffensive pushed Russian forces roughly 40 km east of Kharkiv City.[3] A senior American defense official reported the Ukrainian operation, which is consistent with social media reports from both Ukrainian and Russian sources that Ukrainian troops took control of Staryi Saltiv on May 2.[4] This Ukrainian counteroffensive is very unlikely to affect Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Izyum, as the Russians have not been relying on GLOCs from Kharkiv to support their operations in Izyum but have been using routes further to the east and well beyond the most recent Ukrainian counteroffensive’s limit of advance. The Ukrainian counteroffensive may, however, unhinge the Russian positions northeast of Kharkiv and could set conditions for a broader operation to drive the Russians from most of their positions around the city. This possibility may pose a dilemma for the Russians—whether to reinforce their positions near Kharkiv to prevent such a broader Ukrainian operation or to risk losing most or all of their positions in artillery range of the city.

    Russia’s long-term intentions regarding the status of Mariupol and other occupied areas seem confused. Some anecdotes from Mariupol indicate that Russia may plan to incorporate Mariupol and the surrounding environs into the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR), and possibly annex the DNR to the Russian Federation. Other anecdotes suggest that Russia could directly absorb Mariupol into Rostov Oblast. These inconsistencies could simply be artifacts of reporting or confusion on the ground, but they could also indicate actual confusion about Russia’s long-term plans for governing the Ukrainian regions that Moscow’s forces currently occupy. These anecdotes clearly support the assessment that Putin has no intention of ceding occupied territories back to an independent Ukraine and is, at most, considering exactly how he intends to govern regions that Russia has illegally seized.

    Key Takeaways:

    - Russian forces resumed air, artillery, and ground assaults on the Azovstal Steel Plant following the conclusion of the May 2 evacuation efforts.
    - Russian forces continued to regroup on the Donetsk-Luhansk axis in likely preparation for a westward advance in the direction of Lyman and Slovyansk.
    - The Ukrainian Armed Forces conducted a counteroffensive that likely pushed Russian forces up to 40 km east of Kharkiv City.
    - Russian forces conducted limited ground offensives in Zaporizhia Oblast in the vicinity of Huliapole and intensified reconnaissance operations in the vicinity of Odesa amid growing tensions in Transnistria.
    https://www.understandingwar.org/bac...sessment-may-3

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    Default Re: Ukraine outrage and analysis.

    A long article at ISW on Russian's annexation of parts of Ukraine that the Russian army has captured.

    RUSSIAN ANNEXATION OF OCCUPIED UKRAINE IS PUTIN’S UNACCEPTABLE “OFF-RAMP”

    May 13, 2022 - Press ISW


    By Katherine Lawlor and Mason Clark

    May 13, 2022

    Key Takeaway: Russian President Vladimir Putin likely intends to annex occupied southern and eastern Ukraine directly into the Russian Federation in the coming months. He will likely then state, directly or obliquely, that Russian doctrine permitting the use of nuclear weapons to defend Russian territory applies to those newly annexed territories. Such actions would threaten Ukraine and its partners with nuclear attack if Ukrainian counteroffensives to liberate Russian-occupied territory continue. Putin may believe that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would restore Russian deterrence after his disastrous invasion shattered Russia's conventional deterrent capabilities.

    Putin’s timeline for annexation is likely contingent on the extent to which he understands the degraded state of the Russian military in Ukraine. The Russian military has not yet achieved Putin’s stated territorial objectives of securing all of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and is unlikely to do so. If Putin understands his military weakness, he will likely rush annexation and introduce the nuclear deterrent quickly in an attempt to retain control of the Ukrainian territory that Russia currently occupies. If Putin believes that Russian forces are capable of additional advances, he will likely delay the annexation in hopes of covering more territory with it. In that case, his poor leadership and Ukrainian counteroffensives could drive the Russian military toward a state of collapse. Putin could also attempt to maintain Russian attacks while mobilizing additional forces. He might delay announcing annexation for far longer in this case, waiting until reinforcements could arrive to gain more territory to annex.

    Ukraine and its Western partners likely have a narrow window of opportunity to support a Ukrainian counteroffensive into occupied Ukrainian territory before the Kremlin annexes that territory. Ukraine and the West must also develop a coherent plan for responding to any annexation and to the threat of nuclear attack that might follow it. The political and ethical consequences of a longstanding Russian occupation of southeastern Ukraine would be devastating to the long-term viability of the Ukrainian state. Vital Ukrainian and Western national interests require urgent Western support for an immediate Ukrainian counteroffensive.

    Kremlin Plans to Annex Southern Ukraine:

    Russian President Vladimir Putin likely intends to annex occupied southern and eastern Ukraine directly into the Russian Federation in the coming months to consolidate his control over these territories and possibly deter Ukrainian counterattacks. The Kremlin likely plans to annex much of the Ukrainian territory currently occupied by Russian forces—portions of Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts in the south and the areas of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts in the east that Russian forces and their proxies control. Moscow may also annex other Kremlin proxy statelets like South Ossetia (in Georgia) and Transnistria (in Moldova). ISW has previously detailed the ongoing Kremlin conditions-setting to annex or recognize occupied Kherson, Zaporizhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk.[1] That conditions-setting includes replacing local media with Kremlin-run media outlets, installing Russian internet and communications networks, forcibly transitioning local economies to the Russian ruble, kidnapping, executing, and replacing local Ukrainian officials with Russian collaborators, and likely hunting and eliminating anti-occupation activists and partisans. Widespread Russian atrocities against Ukrainian civilians are part of the established Kremlin playbook to gain control over occupied areas.[2]

    The Kremlin no longer conceals its intentions to annex areas of occupied Ukraine. The secretary of United Russia, Putin’s political party, visited Kherson on May 6 and announced that “Russia is here forever.”[3] The Russian-appointed deputy head of the Kherson Civil-Military Administration, Kirill Stremousov, announced on May 11 that Kherson would develop a legislative framework for joining Russia by the end of 2022 and would entirely forgo a public referendum after reports that Russian occupation authorities were preparing for a fraudulent Kherson independence referendum.[4] He said that the international community did not recognize Russia’s (rigged) referendum on annexing the Crimean Peninsula after Russian forces invaded and captured that Ukrainian territory in 2014, and that a Kherson referendum was therefore unimportant.

    Stremousov said aloud what Russians have tried to obfuscate: Russia will annex Kherson despite widespread local opposition to annexation. Stremousov’s statement shows that the Kremlin likely realizes any attempt to conduct a “referendum” in Kherson would be met with widespread resistance even after months of Russian brutalization and intimidation of the local population. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov did not contradict Stremousov in a May 11 press conference, stating that the Russian annexation of Kherson “must have an absolutely clear legal background, justification, [and] be absolutely legitimate, as was the case with Crimea” but explicitly did not mention a referendum. Russian-appointed Kherson regional head Volodymyr Saldo said on May 9 that “if the Russian Federation is here, then the entire set of laws, the structure and construction of power will be precisely Russian.”[5] He said that he expected “some kind of [Russian] federal district will be created, which will include the Crimea, Kherson, and Zaporizhia regions,” though the Kremlin is not bound to administer an annexed Kherson Oblast in this manner and regularly contravenes the stated expectations of its other proxies.

    The Kremlin has many models for the governance of annexed territories based on Russia’s complex and varied federal system. Occupied territories could be incorporated as oblasts (the administrative unit roughly analogous to American states that comprise most of Russia), republics (like the illegally annexed Crimean peninsula), federal cities (like Russia’s two main cities of Moscow and St Petersburg and the city and naval base of Sevastopol), or an entirely new organizational structure.[6] The Kremlin could also choose to first turn occupied territories into proxy “people’s republics” as an intermediate step, or offer a phased path to annexation. ISW cannot currently forecast which path to annexation the Kremlin will likely pursue, but the recent Russian official comments noted above suggest that outright annexation is currently the most likely.

    The Kremlin’s planned wave of annexations could also include proxy territories outside Ukraine. The newly elected leader of South Ossetia, one of two Russian proxy regions in Georgia created and defended by the Russian military during and after the 2008 Russian invasion of Georgia, said on May 11 that he awaited a Russian “signal” to hold a referendum on joining Russia.[7] His predecessor said in his concession speech on May 9 that his government had already submitted paperwork to prepare and determine a date for the accession referendum.[8] Officials from Abkhazia, the other Russian proxy state in Georgia, said on March 31 that they support but do not share South Ossetia’s aspirations to join Russia, indicating that Abkhazia will likely not be included in a Russian annexation sweep.[9] Separately, US National Intelligence Director Avril Haines warned on May 10 that Putin seeks a land bridge to the Russian proxy Moldovan breakaway region of Transnistria, but does not currently have the military capabilities to achieve that goal.[10] The Kremlin may approve Transnistrian annexation or recognize the independence of the self-declared Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic to set conditions for future operations in Moldova or southwestern Ukraine. Such Russian actions would likely follow the establishment of military control of occupied Ukraine and take account of the fact that Russia almost certainly lacks the military capability to seize the parts of Ukraine, including Odesa, that would be necessary for such a land bridge.

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    Default Re: Ukraine outrage and analysis.

    Part 2:

    Costs and Benefits of Annexation for Russia:

    The direct Russian annexation of any areas of occupied Ukraine would permanently change the pre-invasion legal frameworks codified in the Minsk II Accords and preclude returning to any sort of status quo antebellum. It would thereby cost Putin the opportunity he pursued doggedly from 2014 to 2022—attempting to insert Russian proxies (the DNR and LNR) into the Ukrainian political system as permanent levers of influence. Outright annexation of Ukrainian territory would foreclose the resurrection of the legal frameworks outlined by the Minsk II accords, which depended on treating Russia’s proxy statelets as parts of Ukraine and requiring Kyiv to grant them both autonomy and the rights to participate in the Ukrainian political system. Putin’s recognition of the “independence” of those statelets immediately before the February invasion has already formally changed the situation, to be sure. But whereas one might theoretically imagine Putin trading that “independence” for a return to the Minsk II framework, it is almost impossible to imagine him accepting a retrocession of territory he has formally annexed to the Russian Federation.

    If Putin annexes the occupied territories, therefore, he will have decided to give up the option of using proxies within the Ukrainian political system to resume the hybrid war approach he had taken toward Ukraine since 2014. He would likely make such a decision because he knows his latest invasion has already destroyed any possibility of returning to those Kremlin-favorable frameworks, because he fears a Russian military collapse, or because he seeks to restore credible Russian deterrence by introducing a nuclear threat—or all three. Regardless of Putin’s reasoning, Russia cannot—and will not—accept a return to a pre-war status quo. If the Kremlin directly annexes Ukrainian territory, it will mark a fundamental departure in the Kremlin’s approach to Ukraine, from hybrid warfare and political manipulation to outright military coercion and, if possible, conquest.

    Annexation of Ukrainian lands is likely the only “off-ramp” that Putin is interested in pursuing at this time. Even this face-saving option, which falls far short of the Kremlin's initial war aims of complete regime change in Kyiv, would be a devastating blow to Ukraine and is likely the minimum outcome that the Kremlin is willing to accept. If Putin can declare victory by annexing large swathes of Ukrainian territory, he can better sell the costs of the war to the Russian population and to any sympathetic global audiences. The Kremlin absurdly justified its unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine as defending the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics from Ukrainian “Nazi” aggression and an alleged planned genocide against Russian speakers. The Kremlin likely assesses it must therefore consolidate and justify its gains by annexing at least the currently occupied portions of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts if it seeks to maintain that narrative and claim that it achieved the war's stated objectives.

    A Russian annexation would seek to present Kyiv with a fait accompli that precludes negotiations on territorial boundaries even for a ceasefire by asserting that Russia will not discuss the status of (illegally annexed through military conquest) Russian territory—the argument the Kremlin has used regarding Crimea since 2014. The Kremlin did not seriously engage in its perfunctory negotiations with Ukraine in Istanbul in March and April. After annexing Ukrainian territory, the Kremlin will frame Ukrainian negotiators’ demands for the return of Ukraine’s sovereign territory as absurd requests for Russia to give up its own land and dismiss them.

    A Russian military collapse combined with further Ukrainian battlefield successes or the Kremlin's acceptance that a military collapse is imminent are likely the only other circumstances under which Putin would accept something less than his stated objectives for this phase of the war. Collapse does not necessarily mean a mass surrender or rout of the Russian military. A Russian military collapse would more likely be roughly analogous to the state of the French army from April to June of 1917 during the First World War, when over half the divisions in the French army refused to go on the offensive due to shattered morale and poor leadership.[11] Russian forces in such a state would be extraordinarily vulnerable to concentrated Ukrainian counteroffensives, and the Ukrainian military would be able to pick the battles of its choosing if Russian forces were unwilling to attack. A Russian military collapse would likely involve an endemic level of desertions and “fragging“ of officers, the practice of personnel killing their own officers, both of which have been observed throughout the war.[12] Such a collapse would render further offensives impossible in the current phase of the war in Ukraine and could lead to a disorderly withdrawal of Russian forces from the front lines, as was seen following the Russian loss in the Battle for Kyiv.[13] The Russian military will not be completely destroyed, nor would it have to leave Ukraine before reaching a state of collapse. However, a collapsed Russian military would lose its ability to function as a coherent fighting force. If that happened, Putin might well find himself obliged to accept far less than his current stated objectives.

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    Default Re: Ukraine outrage and analysis.

    Part 3

    Timing:

    The Kremlin has set partial conditions for annexation in areas like Kherson and Zaporizhia and has actually had to rein in some of its proxy officials from the DNR, LNR, and South Ossetia as they clamor for annexation. But the Kremlin has not yet formally announced annexation or the formation of new proxy republics in those areas. The Kremlin must set certain political and military conditions before it can annex occupied territories. Military realities could force a change in timeline or in pacing, however, and Ukrainian military gains in the east could drive a quicker annexation of specific areas.

    The Kremlin likely intends to annex all of the territories it wants to incorporate into Russia at once, rather than stagger the annexation process. The Kremlin likely believes that mass annexation would minimize the longevity of international outrage. The international community eventually normalized relations with Russia following its 2008 invasion of Georgia and the stagnation of its 2014 invasion of Ukraine and annexation of Crimea; Putin would likely seek to replicate that pattern.

    The Kremlin will need to establish relatively comprehensive security and administration structures within its occupied territories before it can announce effective annexation. Unexpectedly stiff Ukrainian resistance in occupied Mariupol’s Azovstal steel plant, as well as anti-occupation protests and partisan activities in Kherson and other occupied areas, have likely slowed the Kremlin’s intended timeline.[14] The Kremlin likely expects strong backlash in occupied Ukrainian territories when it declares formal annexation and therefore is seeking to break up partisan and opposition groups before going forward with annexation, likely through the population-control efforts of Rosgvardia forces.

    The Kremlin must also work to transform its military occupation of Ukrainian territories into a series of political administrations capable of governing newly minted Russian regions before it can formally annex those territories. This process will take time as the Kremlin crushes opposition movements, arrests or kills off local Ukrainian officials, eradicates local governance structures, and replaces them with Russian administrators or Ukrainian collaborators. The longer that Russian forces have to control and subdue occupied Ukrainian territory, the more difficult it will be for Ukraine to rebuild local administrative and governance structures in those areas if they can regain control. The political clock on Ukraine’s ability to regain control of the southeast is ticking.

    The Russian head of the Kherson region said in a May 9 interview that the formation of a regional government was underway.[15] He claimed that there was no widespread or organized violence in Kherson, only “separate manifestations.” These claims (likely exaggerated) may indicate that occupation forces, probably including Rosgvardia troops, have cracked down on Ukrainian resistance and partisan activities in the region, enabled by Russian control of communications infrastructure. The degree of success of those Russian crackdowns, or of ongoing Ukrainian partisan activities, is unclear.

    The Kremlin also likely needs to address internal disagreements on administrative boundaries and organization before formally annexing Ukrainian territory. DNR head Denis Pushilin claimed on May 9 that Mariupol “is the territory of the Donetsk People's Republic forever. No one will take it away from us.”[16] However, conflicting Russian and Ukrainian reports on May 3 suggest that other Russian decisionmakers may be planning to annex Mariupol directly into Russia’s Rostov oblast, rather than into the DNR.[17]

    Intended Effects of Annexation:

    The Kremlin could threaten to use nuclear weapons against a Ukrainian counteroffensive into annexed territory to deter the ongoing Western military aid that would enable such a counteroffensive. The Kremlin has already falsely claimed that Ukrainian strikes on Russian territory—during an unprovoked war of Russian aggression against Ukraine—are somehow escalatory rather than a legal Ukrainian response under the laws of war.[18] However, Russian nuclear doctrine clearly allows for nuclear weapons use in response to “aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy.”[19] The Kremlin could frame a Ukrainian counteroffensive into annexed Ukrainian territory as a threat to the existence of the Russian state—such an absurd claim would be no less plausible than many other claims Russia has already made. Making that claim, however, likely necessitates Russian annexation of occupied territories, rather than creating additional proxy statelets in places like Kherson and Zaporizhia.

    The Kremlin could believe that a nuclear threat would deter ongoing Western military aid that would enable such a Ukrainian counteroffensive. Ukraine and the West should not let that happen. The Kremlin has likely calculated that NATO would rhetorically and materially support Ukrainian counteroffensives into a hypothetical proxy statelet Kherson People’s Republic (or simply Russian-occupied Ukraine), but would not support Ukrainian attacks into the Kherson Oblast of Russia, for example.

    The Kremlin may also believe that Kyiv would be unwilling to directly attack claimed Russian territory, particularly after Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said on March 27 that Ukraine would not try to recapture all Russian-held territory by force, arguing that it could lead to a third world war.[20] Zelensky has repeatedly called for the restoration of the de facto borders as of February 23, the day before Russia’s latest invasion.[21] The Kremlin could conceivably believe that annexation would prevent Ukrainian counteroffensives, even without an explicit nuclear threat.

    Military Supporting Effort:

    In order to enable the annexation of occupied Ukrainian territories, the Kremlin must accomplish the following military objectives:

    Hold and consolidate control of occupied territory. This objective necessitates the disruption of partisan activities and the defense of held territories.
    Stop Ukraine from retaking additional territory. The Kremlin will likely order Russian forces to settle into defensive positions once Kremlin officials accept that the Russian campaign in Donbas has reached its culmination point—if they ever do.
    However, the Kremlin may not have acknowledged that its military campaign in Donbas has stalled. The Kremlin may still believe that its forces can take the rest of Ukrainian-held Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. The Russian proxy head of the DNR claimed on May 9 that the DNR is “faced with the task of regaining control over its territories, and then the republic will decide on its future—almost certainly referring to accession into Russia”[22]

    Russian forces are continuing ineffective offensive operations in eastern Ukraine despite the vanishingly small chance that they will make any substantial territorial gains. The Kremlin is likely operating under one of the following mindsets:

    - It erroneously assesses that Russian forces can complete their stated objective—the complete capture of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts; or
    - It has realized that Russian forces will be unable to completely capture Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts but is continuing to order attacks in order to maintain momentum and prevent the fragmentation of Russian forces; or
    - It is planning a larger mobilization of lower-quality Russian reserves or the general population in order to accomplish its original territorial objectives, forcing a months-long delay for additional Russian forces to arrive and turn the tide (or so the Kremlin might believe).[23]

    Ongoing Russian attacks, though ineffective, do achieve the military objective of pinning Ukrainian defenders in place by threatening further advances. Kyiv may be unwilling to risk pulling the forces it would need to conduct a counteroffensive against occupied southern Ukraine from areas that are currently under Russian attack. If Russian forces accept that they will gain no additional territory in Ukraine and settle into defensive positions themselves, Ukrainian forces will gain an opportunity to seize the initiative and choose where to launch counter-offensives against the depleted Russian forces, which may collapse in the face of a determined counterattack.
    Last edited by welch; May 13th, 2022 at 05:56 PM.

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    Default Re: Ukraine outrage and analysis.

    Part 4

    Forecast:

    We assess that the remainder of this phase of the war in Ukraine will likely follow one of three courses: either Russian forces will annex occupied Ukrainian territory into Russia, the Russian military will stall for time as it attempts to mobilize additional forces, or the Russian military will continue to pursue impossible military objectives with insufficient resources and ultimately collapse in the coming months. Mobilization does not preclude military collapse. Many of the dangers outlined in this assessment hinge on a Russian recognition of its conventional military weakness and a proactive decision to secure Russian gains in Ukraine. Putin’s mistaken decision to invade Ukraine despite Russia’s poor preparation and conventional military capabilities suggests that the West should not rely on clear-eyed Russian assessments of their own military capabilities. Ukrainian forces may be able to force Russian forces out of occupied Donetsk and Luhansk, or at least back to the pre-February borders of the DNR and LNR, if Russian forces do not decide to end their offensives early. If Russian forces make the deliberate choice to end their offensive before the Ukrainian military forces them to do so, that decision would be a strong indicator of imminent annexation. If Russian forces fail to recognize that their Donbas campaign has culminated, the Russian military in Ukraine may be headed for an outright collapse.

    Russian forces will likely either decide to end their offensives in Donetsk and Luhansk and annex the territory they currently hold or they will be militarily defeated by Ukrainian forces. If Russian forces stop shy of capturing the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, the Kremlin will owe the Russian population an explanation as to why it did not achieve its stated objectives. The false Kremlin narrative of an anti-Russian “genocide” in eastern Ukraine traps Russian decisionmakers if they care about narrative consistency: they must “rescue” sufficient territory to claim to have stopped the “genocide” in order to claim victory.[24] Alternatively, the Kremlin could calculate that domestic support for the end of the war is unimportant to its aims and simply claim a victory that is inconsistent with the Kremlin’s running narratives.

    Policy Implications:

    Despite its conventional military failures, the only off-ramp the Kremlin appears to be considering is at least partial victory. Putin likely understands that there will be no return to the Minsk II accords or any similar legal framework that allowed for Russian interference in Ukrainian politics. But Putin has not ceded his longer-term ambition of controlling Kyiv, even though his attempts to take the Ukrainian state by force have failed (for now). If Putin annexes occupied territory and the conflict settles in along new front lines, the Kremlin could reconstitute its forces and renew Putin’s invasion of Ukraine in the coming years, this time from a position of greater strength and territorial advantage.

    The West must take seriously the real and likely threat that Russia will annex southeastern Ukraine and the expand Russian nuclear doctrine to cover that newly annexed territory. Russia’s annexation plans are not guaranteed to succeed. They depend on consolidating control of occupied territory, establishing administrative capabilities, and preventing a Ukrainian counteroffensive. The West must do what it can to deter Putin’s expansionism while also preparing an answer that offers Ukraine more than capitulation.

    Ukraine and its Western partners likely have a narrow window of opportunity to support a Ukrainian counteroffensive into occupied Ukrainian territory before the Kremlin annexes that territory (or brings up additional forces). This window of opportunity is not necessarily obvious. In a military sense, Ukrainian forces should begin their counteroffensive before Russian forces decide that their campaign has culminated and begin to dig into more orderly and possibly morale-boosting defensive positions. Poor morale and worse leadership have soundly degraded Russian forces; Ukraine should ideally counter-attack at the time of maximum Russian disorder before Russian forces have time to fully go over to the defensive and dig in.

    The political and ethical consequences of a longstanding Russian occupation of southeastern Ukraine would be devastating to the long-term viability of the Ukrainian state and necessitate Western support for a more immediate Ukrainian counteroffensive. Every day that occupied Ukraine remains under Russian control is another day of horrific human rights abuses, targeted degradation of Ukrainian governance structures, and “filtration” of civilian populations. If Ukrainian forces do not retake southeastern Ukraine before Moscow annexes that territory, Kyiv may find that the southeast has become irreparably mired in the same situation that Crimea has faced since 2014.



    [1] https://understandingwar.org/backgro...sion-update-25

    [2] https://www.understandingwar.org/bac...lp-ukraine-fre...

    [3] https://tass dot ru/politika/14565509

    [4] https://lenta dot ru/news/2022/05/11/stremousov/; https://www.unian dot net/war/novosti-hersonskoy-oblasti-russkie-sobirayut-dannye-grazhdan-dlya-provedeniya-referenduma-novosti-vtorzheniya-rossii-na-ukrainu-11801946.html

    [5] https://tass dot ru/interviews/14580151

    [6] https://assets.publishing.service.go...s/system/uploa...

    [7] https://finance.yahoo.com/news/break...waits-signal-0...

    [8] https://ria dot ru/20220509/referendum-1787575207.html

    [9] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/...setia-plans-to...

    [10] https://edition.cnn.com/europe/live-...r-news-05-11-2...

    [11] Ashworth, Tony (2000). Trench Warfare, 1914–18: The Live and Let Live System. Grand Strategy.

    [12] https://www.understandingwar.org/bac...e-campaign...; https://www.understandingwar.org/bac...e-campaign...; https://www.understandingwar.org/bac...e-campaign...;

    [13] https://understandingwar.org/backgro...e-campaign-ass...

    [14] https://www.understandingwar.org/bac...aign-assessmen...

    [15] https://tass dot ru/interviews/14580151

    [16] https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news...ws-05-09-22/h_...

    [17] https://www.understandingwar.org/bac...nsive-campaign...

    [18] https://understandingwar.org/backgro...sion-update-25

    [19] https://rusemb dot org dot uk/press/2029#:~:text=25.,with%20the%20Collective%20Securit y%20Treaty.
    https://globalsecurityreview.com/nuc...sias-deterrenc...

    [20] https://www.aljazeera dot com/news/2022/3/27/ready-to-go-for-it-zelenskyy-is-willing-to-discuss-neutrality

    [21] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61359228

    [22] https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news...ws-05-09-22/h_...

    [23] https://www.understandingwar.org/bac...ssian-conscrip...

    [24] https://understandingwar.org/backgro...victory-day-sp...

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    Default Re: Ukraine outrage and analysis.

    That gives Putin the "win" (at least an argument to the Russian people), and the land bridge.

    The Russian campaign culminated some time ago, and he is losing ground other than the gains in the east, but his securing of those is tentative.

    If Putin is sincere in offering this "off ramp", then the initiative (finally) shifts to Ukraine. They can either continue their counter offensive or accept terms (existing or modified through negotiation).

    I don't think Putin has the political capital to call reserves if Ukraine continues the fight. I don't think he has the materiel reserves (operational equipment and ammunition), nor the personnel to continue the fight.

    The remaining variable is whether or not the West continues to support Ukraine if they refuse to agree to whatever the "off ramp" turns out to be. Ukraine's success hinges on western munitions and technology. They have a materiel problem as well.

    The west's stance is one of political capital as well. People will only have so much tolerance for inflation and fuel prices, more debt, and in the U.S. case particularly: petty partisan politics with a mid-term approaching.
    "A truth does not mind being questioned. A lie does not like being challenged."

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    Default Re: Ukraine outrage and analysis.

    There are reports that river crossings attempted by Russian forces met absolute failure with a near total loss of armored vehicles and crippling casualties.

    Ukrainians have repelled multiple attempts by the Russians to cross a strategically significant river in the Donbas, inflicting heavy losses in the process, according to local officials and British intelligence. Serhiy Haidai, the governor of the Luhansk region, said Russian forces had been repulsed three times as they tried to cross the river, losing armour and bridging equipment.

    “We have eliminated Russian speedboats and helicopters which they used to cover their attempts,” the governor added, while aerial photography showed destroyed pontoon bridges and armour by the riverbanks. Earlier on Friday, British defence intelligence said Russia had lost “significant armoured manoeuvre elements” from a battalion tactical group – a formation with about 800 personnel at full strength – from the failed efforts. Russian attempts to gain territory in the Donbas are increasingly focused on Severodonetsk, the easternmost town held by Ukrainian forces – and the Russian forces were trying to cross the river in an attempt to cut off the town.

    Ukraine’s defence ministry tweeted pictures of a smashed pontoon bridge and destroyed armoured vehicles in Bilohorivka on Wednesday, describing them as showing victims of “artillerymen of the 17th tank brigade”. The British assessment appeared to verify that, and quantify the level of loss – effectively the equipment strength of one battalion of up to 90 Russian units operating in and near Ukraine. Another open source analyst estimated 73 Russian pieces of equipment, including tanks and armoured vehicles, were destroyed, relying on aerial photography of the aftermath of the battle.

    “Conducting river crossings in a contested environment is a highly risky manoeuvre and speaks to the pressure the Russian commanders are under to make progress in their operations in eastern Ukraine,” the British Ministry of Defence said on Friday morning.


    https://www.theguardian.com/world/20...?share=twitter

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    Default Re: Ukraine outrage and analysis.

    I saw that the other day. River crossings are very hard, and coordinated at the division level (in U.S. terms, 15,000 troops commanded by a two-star). Point being it says much about the level of planning and training Russia has done. It’s a big deal, and my email is jam packed with “did you see this?” emails.
    "A truth does not mind being questioned. A lie does not like being challenged."

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    Default Re: Ukraine outrage and analysis.

    Zelensky says Macron urged him to yield territory in bid to end Ukraine war

    French President Emmanuel Macron has urged Ukraine to offer territorial concessions to Russia in a bid to end the fighting, according to the embattled Ukrainian leader, even as invading Russian forces struggle to achieve their objectives.

    "Macron wanted to see results in mediation between us ... and suggested to me certain things related to concessions on our sovereignty in order to help Putin save his face,” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky told an Italian media outlet, according to a Ukrainian media translation of his remarks. “We are not ready to help someone to save something and lose our territories for it.”

    That characterization of Macron hearkens back to the perceived negotiating dynamics in the weeks leading up to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s campaign to overthrow the Ukrainian government, when Russian officials urged France and Germany to press Zelensky into making concessions in long-stalled peace talks as an alternative to the conflict. The resilience of Ukraine's defense forces has drawn Western leaders into providing additional weaponry and pledging their support for Ukraine’s victory in the war, and Macron has cautioned against the “humiliation” of Russia.

    “Everyone is united in the opinion that it is necessary to restore the territorial integrity of Ukraine,” Zelensky said. “At least that's what European leaders, the United States, Canada, Britain, and so on, tell me.”

    The discovery of mass graves outside of Kyiv and other apparent Russian war crimes prompted trans-Atlantic powers to increase their support for Ukraine. And President Joe Biden’s administration, despite its initial misgivings about whether a Russian posture could prompt Putin to use weapons of mass destruction, has adopted a bolder rhetorical posture as Russia’s battlefield defeats accumulate.

    “Russia has failed to overthrow the Ukrainian Government, Russia lost the battle for Kyiv, and we’ve seen now Russia retreat and refocus its forces on Ukraine’s southeast,” State Department assistant secretary Karen Donfried, the lead U.S. envoy for Europe, told reporters Friday morning. “So our focus today is on strengthening Ukraine’s hand as much as possible on the battlefield, so that when the time does come, Ukraine has as much leverage as possible at the negotiating table. So I want to be very clear that we want to see this war end as soon as possible while supporting Ukraine’s success so that those negotiations happen on Ukraine’s terms.”

    There are signs nonetheless that some leaders sense a tension between backing Ukraine and ending the conflict. Macron implied that a one-sided Ukrainian victory could repeat the mistakes of the Versailles Treaty of 1919, which brought World War I to a catastrophic conclusion for Germany yet failed to avert a second global conflict.

    “So that justice prevails, we are fighting and will continue to fight against the impunity of unspeakable crimes committed by Russia in Ukraine,” the French leader said Monday. “However, we are not at war with Russia. ... In the end, when peace returns to European soil, we will need to build new security balances, and we will need, together, to never give in to the temptation of humiliation, nor the spirit of revenge, because these have already in the past wreaked enough havoc on the roads to peace.”

    Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi sent a similar signal in Washington this week, moments after affirming his commitment to “helping Ukraine” fend off the Russian attack.

    “But I have to tell you that in Italy and in Europe now, people want to put an end to this massacres — to these massacres, to this violence, this butchery that’s happening,” Draghi said. “People think that — at least they want to think about the possibility of bringing a ceasefire and starting again some credible negotiations.”

    Zelensky maintained that he would be willing to meet with Putin, who has declined to meet with him, if Russian forces retreat back into the Ukrainian territory that they held prior to the launch of the new campaign on Feb. 24.

    "We understand that peace comes after every war, and even when there is a 1% chance of ending the war through dialogue and resolving a military conflict, we need to cling to it,” he said. "However, in the negotiations, we are ready to say — at least get out of the territory you occupied starting from the 24th. Yes, in some of our temporarily occupied territories, you unfortunately continue to stay. But this is the first clear step to talk about something.”
    "A truth does not mind being questioned. A lie does not like being challenged."

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    Default Re: Ukraine outrage and analysis.

    Russia likely to have lost third of its Ukraine invasion force, says UK

    Russia may have lost a third of the invasion force it sent into Ukraine as its offensive continues to struggle in the face of stiff resistance, British military intelligence has said.

    In its latest assessment, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) said the Russian campaign in the east of Ukraine had “lost momentum” and was now “significantly behind schedule”.

    At a meeting of Nato foreign ministers in Berlin, the foreign secretary, Liz Truss, said it was essential to maintain support for the government in Kyiv to help it “push Russia out”.

    She said in a statement: “Putin must face a sustained defeat in Ukraine, Russia must be contained and such aggression must never happen again.

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    “Ukraine’s security must come from it being able to defend itself. Allies must support Ukraine’s move to Nato-standard equipment, immediately providing artillery, training and the required expertise.”

    The Nato deputy secretary general, Mircea Geoană, said the Ukrainians were now in a position to defeat the Russians and win the war.

    “The brutal invasion of Russia is losing momentum,” he told reporters.

    “With significant support from allies and partners in billions of dollars, in military support, in financial support, humanitarian support, we know that with the bravery of the Ukrainian people and army and with our help, Ukraine can win this war.”

    The Russians switched the focus of their offensive to the eastern Donbas region – which was already part-held by pro-Moscow separatists – after their advance on Kyiv was driven back.

    However the MoD said despite small-scale initial advances, they had failed to make any substantial territorial gains over the past month while suffering “consistently high levels of attrition”.

    It said the offensive was being further hampered by the loss of “critical enablers” such as bridging equipment and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance drones.

    “Russia has now likely suffered losses of one-third of the ground combat force it committed in February,” it said.

    “Russian forces are increasingly constrained by degraded enabling capabilities, continued low morale and reduced combat effectiveness.

    “Many of these capabilities cannot be quickly replaced or reconstituted and are likely to continue to hinder Russian operations in Ukraine.

    “Under the current conditions, Russia is unlikely to dramatically accelerate its rate of advance over the next 30 days.”
    https://www.theguardian.com/world/20...-force-says-uk

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    Default Re: Ukraine outrage and analysis.

    And there is this:

    Growing evidence of a military disaster on the Donets pierces a pro-Russian bubble.

    May 15, 2022, 11:01 a.m. ET2 hours ago

    Anton Troianovski and Marc Santora


    The destruction wreaked on a Russian battalion as it tried to cross a river in northeastern Ukraine last week is emerging as among the deadliest engagements of the war, with estimates based on publicly available evidence now suggesting that well over 400 Russian soldiers were killed or wounded.

    And as the scale of what happened comes into sharper focus, the disaster appears to be breaking through the Kremlin’s tightly controlled information bubble.

    Perhaps most striking, the Russian battlefield failure is resonating with a stable of pro-Russian war bloggers — some of whom are embedded with troops on the front line — who have reliably posted to the social network Telegram with claims of Russia success and Ukrainian cowardice.

    “The commentary by these widely read milbloggers may fuel burgeoning doubts in Russia about Russia’s prospects in this war and the competence of Russia’s military leaders,” the Institute for the Study of War, a Washington-based research body, wrote over the weekend.

    On May 11, the Russian command reportedly sent about 550 troops of the 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 41st Combined Arms Army to cross the Donets River at Bilohorivka, in the eastern Luhansk region, in a bid to encircle Ukrainian forces near Rubizhne.

    Satellite images reveal that Ukrainian artillery destroyed several Russian pontoon bridges and laid waste to a tight concentration of Russian troops and equipment around the river.

    The Institute for the Study of War, citing analyses based on the publicly available imagery, indicated that there could have been as many as 485 Russian soldiers killed or wounded and more than 80 pieces of equipment destroyed.

    As the news of the losses at the river crossing in Bilohorivka started to spread, some Russian bloggers did not appear to hold back in their criticism of what they said was incompetent leadership.

    “I’ve been keeping quiet for a long time,” Yuri Podolyak, a war blogger with 2.1 million followers on Telegram, said in a video posted on Friday, saying that he had avoided criticizing the Russian military until now.

    “The last straw that overwhelmed my patience was the events around Bilohorivka, where due to stupidity — I emphasize, because of the stupidity of the Russian command — at least one battalion tactical group was burned, possibly two.”

    Mr. Podolyak ridiculed the Kremlin line that the war is going “according to plan.” He told his viewers in a five-minute video that, in fact, the Russian Army was short of functional unmanned drones, night-vision equipment and other kit “that is catastrophically lacking on the front.”

    “Yes, I understand that it’s impossible for there to be no problems in war,” he said. “But when the same problems go on for three months, and nothing seems to be changing, then I personally and in fact millions of citizens of the Russian Federation start to have questions for these leaders of the military operation.”

    Another popular blogger, who goes by Starshe Eddy on Telegram, wrote that the fact that commanders left so much of their force exposed amounted to “not idiocy, but direct sabotage.”

    And a third, Vladlen Tatarski, posted that Russia’s eastern offensive was moving slowly not just because of a lack of surveillance drones but also “these generals” and their tactics.

    “Until we get the last name of the military genius who laid down a B.T.G. by the river and he answers for it publicly, we won’t have had any military reforms,” Mr. Tatarski wrote. [My comment: that "military genius is named Vladimir Putin]

    Western military analysts have also pored over the imagery and say the attempted crossing demonstrated a stunning lack of tactical sense.

    They have speculated that Russian commanders, desperate to make progress, rushed the operation. Some also suggested that it was a reflection of disorder in the Russian ranks.

    If the estimates that hundreds of soldiers were killed or injured prove accurate, it would be one of the deadliest known engagements of the war.

    There were more than 500 sailors aboard the Russian Black Sea flagship Moskva when it was struck by a Ukrainian missile in April. The Kremlin at first insisted that all the sailors were rescued, later saying one was killed. But even as the families of missing sailors have publicly demanded answers, the Kremlin has largely kept up an official silence on the fate of the crew, part of a larger campaign to suppress bad news.

    Anton Troianovski is the Moscow bureau chief for The New York Times. He was previously Moscow bureau chief of The Washington Post and spent nine years with The Wall Street Journal in Berlin and New York. @antontroian

    Marc Santora is the International News Editor based in London, focusing on breaking news events. He was previously the Bureau Chief for East and Central Europe based in Warsaw. He has also reported extensively from Iraq and Africa.

    https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/15/w...s-kremlin.html

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    Default Re: Ukraine outrage and analysis.

    The info there from the bloggers is very interesting.

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    Default Re: Ukraine outrage and analysis.


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    Default Re: Ukraine outrage and analysis.

    Global economic tremors complicate Western leaders’ Russia sanctions

    As world financial leaders meet in Germany, mounting recession fears pose new hurdles to financial attacks on the Kremlin


    By Jeff Stein and Emily Rauhala
    Updated May 18, 2022 at 10:05 a.m. EDT|Published May 18, 2022 at 10:03 a.m. EDT

    BONN, Germany — Growing fears of a global economic slowdown are complicating Western allies’ economic campaign against Russia, as world leaders struggle to craft new punishments for Moscow without compounding inflation and other domestic financial challenges.

    When Russia invaded Ukraine in late February, American and European economic leaders believed their countries were on track for a successful rebound from the coronavirus pandemic and hopeful that inflation might abate. But three months later, the global finance ministers gathering in western Germany this week face a more worrying international economic outlook amid fears that central bank interest hikes could help push parts of the global economy into recession. These head winds are putting additional pressure on the United States and Europe to ensure their sanctions on Russia do not further tip the world into a new economic crisis.

    Nations move to tackle inflation, increasing risk to global economy

    Already, experts say, the economic consequences of the war have sent the cost of food skyward, which risks sparking a hunger crisis in parts of the developing world. Energy prices have also soared both in Europe and the United States — despite President Biden’s move to release an enormous amount of the nation’s oil reserves — in an added strain on consumers facing the highest rates of inflation in four decades. The U.K. government on Wednesday reported that prices in April were up 9 percent from one year ago, outpacing inflation even in the United States.

    Some Western leaders want to go much further to choke Russia off from the global economy by depriving it of its substantial quantities of international oil and gas sales. But there may be limits to how much economic pain voters are willing to tolerate.

    The European Union on Monday slashed its economic forecast because of the war in Ukraine and warned that the fallout from the fighting could make things significantly worse. “An escalation of the war, a sudden stop of energy deliveries, or a further deceleration of economic activity in the U.S. and China, could result in a much grimmer outlook,” the European Commission warned.

    “The global economic situation, particularly high inflation, makes it even harder for Western countries to impose full sanctions — especially on Russian energy,” said Gerard DiPippo, a senior fellow in the economics program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a D.C.-based think tank. To date, DiPippo said, the sanctions imposed on Russia “are the most comprehensive sanctions put on a major economy since the Second World War. But they’re ultimately a political act that requires the consent of the country imposing it and enduring the cost from any blowback or effects on their own economy.”

    The extent of the existing U.S. and European sanctions on Russia over the war remain extraordinary, with the Western powers targeting the Kremlin’s central bank reserves, financial elites tied to Russian President Vladimir Putin, and key sectors of the country’s economy, including its defense base and banking industry, among other measures few predicted at the war’s outset. The Institute of International Finance has estimated that Russia’s economy could shrink by as much as 15 percent this year alone.

    But even as the E.U. has worked with the United States and other allies to target Moscow, it has continued to buy Russian fossil fuels, keeping money flowing to Moscow. Some, including Baltic nations and some other Eastern European countries, have pushed hard for a full and immediate embargo. Others have resisted, worried about the economic consequences.

    In April, the bloc agreed to phase out coal, but it remains stuck on oil and gas. On May 4, after weeks of deliberation, the European Commission proposed a plan to phase out imports of oil from Russia. It included extensions for two countries — Hungary and Slovakia — that remain heavily dependent on imports, according to E.U. diplomats. But in the two weeks since, E.U. countries have not approved the deal, as other countries pressed for extensions and Hungary pushed for more money to upgrade its oil infrastructure.

    E.U. officials and diplomats are expected to discuss the issue again Wednesday in Brussels, though the focus will be on “REPowerEU,” the bloc’s longer-term plan to make Europe independent from Russian fossil fuels “well before 2030.” Diplomats will be watching to see if the plan includes funding that could help convince Hungary to fall in line on the oil phaseout.

    U.S. and E.U. officials said there is still some optimism that there will be a deal — eventually. Other experts point out that the Americans and Europeans have moved swiftly to punish Russia even at risk to their own economies, in addition to mobilizing tens of billions in international economic assistance for Ukraine.

    “I believe that Europe will on the whole stand firm with the Biden administration in developing and applying sanctions against Russia for its barbaric war on Ukraine,” said Mark Sobel, who previously served as deputy assistant secretary for international monetary and financial policy at the Treasury Department.

    Josep Borrell, the E.U.’s foreign policy chief, acknowledged to reporters on Tuesday that the war could lead to commodity price increases in many countries, but he said Europe would have to adapt to new circumstances.

    “All our partners consider and feel the direct impact Russia’s war is causing around the world. I said before — on energy prices, on food shortages and inflation,” Borrell said. “Unhappily, all these things together will bring the world to the edge of another recession whatever they do. We will have to adapt our financial support in line with these new needs.”

    The oil proposal now on the table for E.U. nations does not include any measures on Russian gas, where there is even greater disagreement among member states.

    In recent days, the bloc also appeared to soften its tone on whether E.U. countries can continue to buy Russian gas without violating sanctions, paving the way for European countries to keep buying despite the bloc’s bellicose rhetoric about the war.

    Finding a way for companies to keep gas flowing could help avoid a confrontation with Russia as the next round of bills come due. In April, Russia’s state-controlled gas company, Gazprom, shut off the supply of natural gas to Poland and Bulgaria when they refused a Kremlin demand to pay in rubles — and threatened more cutoffs to come.

    A push to try to cap the cost of Russian energy has also fizzled, though global financial leaders were expected to discuss the idea at the conference in Germany of the Group of Seven countries. Treasury officials recently raised with the Europeans ideas for imposing price mechanisms that could be paired with their commitment to ban Russian energy after an initial period, according to one person familiar with the matter, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to describe private conversations. But that plan has been discussed for weeks and has to up to this point gained little traction. Treasury Secretary Janet L. Yellen told reporters Tuesday that the United States and the Europeans have discussed a wide range of options, but noted: “We’re not trying to tell them what’s in their best interest.”

    Rauhala reported from Brussels.
    https://www.washingtonpost.com/us-po...omy-sanctions/

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    Default Re: Ukraine outrage and analysis.

    Russian advance halted by cat.


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    Default Re: Ukraine outrage and analysis.

    Report says that Russian invasion appears to be genocide.

    This is the table of contents, in my unformatted copy. Read the details and evidence in the report itself, linked below.

    This report comprises an independent inquiry into whether the Russian Federation bears State
    responsibility for breaches of the Genocide Convention in its invasion of Ukraine and concludes there are:

    1) reasonable grounds to conclude Russia is responsible for (i) direct and public incitement to
    commit genocide, and (ii) a pattern of atrocities from which an inference of intent to destroy the
    Ukrainian national group in part can be drawn; and

    2) the existence of a serious risk of genocide in Ukraine, triggering the legal obligation of all States
    to prevent genocide.

    I. The Protected Group. The Ukrainian national group is recognized domestically, internationally,
    and expressly by Russia in formal interstate relations and is thus protected under the Genocide
    Convention.

    II. Incitement to Genocide. Under Art. III (c) of the Genocide Convention, direct and public
    incitement to commit genocide is a distinct crime whether or not genocide follows.

    III. Russia’s State-orchestrated Incitement to Genocide.

    a) Denial of the Existence of a Ukrainian Identity. High level Russian officials and State
    media commentators repeatedly and publicly deny the existence of a distinct Ukrainian
    identity, implying that those who self-identify as Ukrainian threaten the unity of Russia
    or are Nazis, and are therefore deserving of punishment. Denial of the existence of
    protected groups is a specific indicator of genocide under the United Nations guide to
    assessing the risk of mass atrocities.

    b) Accusation in a Mirror. “Accusation in a mirror” is a powerful, historically recurring
    form of incitement to genocide. A perpetrator accuses the targeted group of planning, or
    having committed, atrocities like those the speaker envisions against them, framing the
    putative victims as an existential threat and making violence against them seem defensive
    and necessary. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian officials did exactly this,
    making the utterly false claim that Ukraine had committed genocide or exterminated the
    civilian population in Russian-backed separatist-controlled areas, as their pretext for
    invading Ukraine.

    c) “Denazification” and Dehumanization. Russian officials and State media repeatedly
    invoke “denazification” as one of the main goals of the invasion and have broadly
    described Ukrainians as subhuman (“zombified,” “bestial,” or “subordinate”), diseased or
    contaminated (“scum,” “filth,” “disorder”) or existential threats and the epitome of evil
    (“Nazism,” “Hitler youth,” “Third Reich”). This rhetoric is used to portray a substantial
    segment or an entire generation of Ukrainians as Nazis and mortal enemies, rendering
    them legitimate or necessary targets for destruction.

    d) Construction of Ukrainians as an Existential Threat. In the Russian context, the Stateorchestrated incitement campaign overtly links the current invasion to the Soviet Union’s
    existential battles with Nazi Germany in World War II, amplifying the propaganda’s
    impact on the Russian public to commit or condone mass atrocities. On April 5, 2022,
    Dmitry Medvedev, current Deputy Chair of the Russian Security Council, posted:
    “having transformed itself into the Third Reich … Ukraine will suffer the same fate …
    what it deserves! These tasks cannot be completed instantaneously. And they will not
    only be decided on battlefields.” The day before the widely celebrated Victory Day,
    marking the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany, President Putin sent a Telegram to
    Russian-backed separatists claiming Russians are fighting “for the liberation of their
    native land from Nazi filth,” vowing that “victory will be ours, like in 1945.” The
    Russian Orthodox Church has publicly reinforced this historical parallel and praised
    Russia’s fight against Nazis.

    e) Conditioning the Russian Audience to Commit or Condone Atrocities. The Russian
    Federation authorities have denied atrocities committed by its forces and rewarded
    soldiers suspected of mass killing in Ukraine, enabling soldiers to commit, and the
    Russian public to condone, further atrocities. These authorities are able to directly incite
    the public by funnelling and amplifying their propaganda through a controlled media
    landscape and extreme censorship around the war. The purveyors of incitement
    propaganda are all highly influential political, religious, and State-run media figures,
    including President Putin. There is mounting evidence that Russian soldiers have
    internalized and are responding to the State propaganda campaign by echoing its content
    while committing atrocities. Reported statements by soldiers include: threats to rape
    “every Nazi whore,” “hunting Nazis,” “we will liberate you from Nazis,” “we’re here to
    cleanse you from the dirt” (following a public execution), among others.

    IV. Genocidal Intent. What distinguishes genocide from other international crimes is the “intent to
    destroy, in whole or in part, [a protected group], as such.” This intent can be attributed to a State
    through evidence of a general plan (derived from official statements, documents, or policy) or
    can be inferred from a systematic pattern of atrocities targeting the protected group. The five
    genocidal acts — killing, causing serious harm, deliberately inflicting physically destructive
    conditions of life, imposing birth prevention measures, and forcibly transferring children to
    another group — can also point towards genocidal intent when viewed in their totality.

    a) A Genocidal Plan. A “general plan” to destroy the Ukrainian national group in part may
    be demonstrated by the incitement to genocide driving the current invasion or by the
    striking patterns or methods of atrocities suggesting military policy.

    V. Genocidal Pattern of Destruction Targeting Ukrainians.

    a) Mass Killings. Investigations have determined that Russian forces have rounded up
    Ukrainian civilians for mass executions across occupied territory, marked by a pattern of
    common killing methods — hands tied, tortured, and shot in the head at close range. The
    well-documented Bucha massacre may indicate consistent tactics employed by Russian
    forces across currently inaccessible occupied areas. The number of mass graves in
    Russian controlled areas are rapidly expanding, as documented by investigators and
    satellite imagery, though the full extent of the killing will not be known until access to
    sites controlled by Russian forces is secure.

    b) Deliberate Attacks on Shelters, Evacuation Routes, and Humanitarian Corridors.
    Russian forces are systematically attacking shelters and evacuation routes with precision,
    indicating military policy, killing and trapping civilians in besieged or conflict areas.

    c) Indiscriminate Bombardment of Residential Areas. Russian forces have extensively
    used inherently indiscriminate weapons with wide-area effect, or cluster munitions,
    targeting densely populated areas in at least eight of Ukraine’s oblasts (provinces).

    d) Russian Military Sieges: Deliberate and Systematic Infliction of Life-Threatening
    Conditions. While bombarding Ukrainians in besieged areas from within and without,
    Russian forces have simultaneously and deliberately inflicted life-threatening conditions
    on them.

    i. Destruction of Vital Infrastructure. Russian forces follow a similar pattern in
    besieging Ukrainian cities, first striking water, power, and communication
    sources, and further targeting medical facilities, grain warehouses, and aid
    distribution centers, suggesting a military strategy and policy of deliberately
    inflicting fatal conditions on Ukrainians. These coordinated actions by the
    Russian military to deprive Ukrainians of basic necessities and trap them under
    these destructive conditions tend to demonstrate that the sieges are calculated to
    bring about their physical destruction.

    ii. Attacks on Health Care. As of May 25, the World Health Organization has
    documented 248 attacks on Ukraine’s health care system.
    iii. Destruction and Seizure of Necessities, Humanitarian Aid, and Grain.
    Russian forces have destroyed and seized vast stores of grain, including

    3
    expropriating hundreds of thousands of tons to Russia, and repeatedly blocked or
    seized humanitarian aid or workers seeking to evacuate civilians, using starvation
    as a weapon of war.

    iv. Other Sites of Life-Threatening Conditions. Russian forces have held
    Ukrainian civilians at other sites where they are deprived of basic necessities, at
    times leading to more immediate deaths by suffocation or starvation.

    e) Rape and Sexual Violence. Reports of sexual violence and rape in Russian-occupied
    areas of Ukraine suggest a widespread and systematic pattern, including gang rape, rape
    in homes or shelters, rape of parents in front of children and vice versa.

    f) Forcible Transfer of Ukrainians. Russia has reported the relocation of over one million
    people from Ukraine to Russia since the invasion began, including over 180,000 children.
    Refugees and officials have reported being transferred by force or threat of force.
    According to Ukrainian officials, Russian legislation is being reformed to expedite the
    adoption of children from the Donbas, while Ukrainian children forcibly sent to Russia
    are forced to take Russian classes. The forcible transfer of Ukrainian children to Russia is
    a genocidal act under Art. II(e) of the Genocide Convention.

    VI. Intent to Destroy the Ukrainian National Group in Part. The intent to destroy a group “in
    part” has been understood to require the targeting of a substantial or prominent part of the group.
    To assess this threshold, however, the scale of atrocities targeting Ukrainians must be viewed
    relative to Russia’s area of activity or control. Russian forces have left a trail of concentrated
    physical destruction upon retreat from occupied areas, including mass close-range executions,
    torture, destruction of vital infrastructure, and rape and sexual violence. The selective targeting of
    Ukrainian leaders or activists for enforced disappearance or murder is further evidence of intent
    to destroy the Ukrainian national group in part, as those figures are emblematic of the group or
    essential to the group’s survival.

    VII. The Duty to Prevent Genocide. States have a legal obligation to prevent genocide beyond their
    borders once they become aware of the serious risk of genocide — a threshold that this report
    clearly establishes has been met, of which States cannot now deny knowledge. The Genocide
    Convention imposes a minimum legal obligation on States to take reasonable action to contribute
    toward preventing genocide and protecting vulnerable Ukrainian civilians from the imminent risk
    of genocide
    https://newlinesinstitute.org/wp-con...revent-1-1.pdf

  29. #359
    Senior Member dneal's Avatar
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    Default Re: Ukraine outrage and analysis.

    Russia has certainly committed war crimes, but the genocide argument seems a little specious. Essentially any conflict could be labeled genocide, using the parameters in the piece.

    It seems to be an argument designed to force other nations to commit or intervene in the conflict.
    "A truth does not mind being questioned. A lie does not like being challenged."

  30. #360
    Senior Member Chip's Avatar
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    Default Re: Ukraine outrage and analysis.

    That many Ukrainians are indistinguishable in ethnicity and language from Russians does undermine the genocide designation.

    Without lessening the invasion as a monstrous, vicious crime.

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