Russia-Ukraine War: Estimating Casualties & Military Equipment Losses
Carl Conetta, Project on Defense Alternatives, 21 March 2022
Within days of the Russian invasion, it became clear that Moscow’s effort to seize Ukraine had stumbled badly. The Russian military had expected a quick win, but found itself facing a hard slog instead. But why? And how to measure the conflict now?
The “whys” are multiple and intersecting:
First, the operation reflected an exceptionally ambitious goal: complete seizure and “demilitarization” of the largest European country apart from Russia itself. The operational plan supporting this goal was complex, dividing the effort along several axes. It aimed to overtax and section Ukraine’s defenses, isolate the capital, and envelop Ukraine’s main force in the east. But a plan this grand and complex tempts collapse.
Second, the size and complexity of the operation required a deep draw on Russia’s military. The invading force could not be limited to Moscow’s best and most experienced units. And many of the selected units seemed incapable of managing the fog and friction of war.
Third, the Russian military came expecting to fight the weak force it had faced and badly mauled in 2014 and 2015. It planned, organized, and provisioned accordingly. Moscow also expected the Ukrainian populace to be as divided now as it was in 2010. One result was that Russian units initially moved forward in small, light units, hoping to seize the prize with minimal combat and destruction. But both assumptions about Ukraine proved wrong. And as the Russian advance slowed and stalled, logistical problems set in.
Ukraine had begun a process of military reform and revitalization following establishment of the Minsk II cease fire in 2015. The cease fire mostly held for seven years during which time several NATO countries afforded Ukraine increasing levels of military assistance – material, training, and intelligence support. The country’s special operations forces gained special attention. Ukraine’s progress in military reform has been modest, but sufficient to enable it to exploit the weaknesses in Russia’s initial assault, attacking its vulnerable supply lines, relying on portable anti-armor weapons and small unit tactics to ambush armored vehicle, and fighting pitched battles in urban settings as the war progressed.
Within a week of invading, the Russian military was struggling to revise its approach. Earlier errors impeded any quick reorganization and resupply, but Russia has progressively transitioned to a heavier, more balanced mode of warfare, with greater reliance on artillery and siege tactics. Paradoxically, as Russian artillery and air attack now bear down, Ukraine may suffer the most from its relative early success in stalling Russian forces. That is, success called forth the current onslaught, which was always implicit in the lopsided Russia-Ukraine balance of forces.
The contest over measuring gains and losses
How do the two sides compare in terms of personnel and equipment losses? That’s a matter of dispute, of course. These seemingly objective measures are subject to a rather intensive propaganda war, as both sides try to shape the opinion and morale of both fighters and publics, their own and their opponents’.
In fact, the information war is not two sided – Russia vs Ukraine – but multi-sided. The types and degree of risk that US and European governments are willing to bear, and the types and extent of support they are willing to offer Ukraine are influenced by public perception of the war and its progress, which in turn is subject to shaping. And this helps explain the wide divergence in estimates of loss.
What’s at issue is not simply an accurate accounting of the war’s costs, but policy choices – such as declaration of a “no fly” zone or cross-border flights of substitute fighter aircraft – that might tempt a much broader and more destructive conflict. Where the trigger for escalation sits is a policy decision. This post looks at some of the information dynamics that are shaping such decisions.
Personnel losses
Consider that on March 15 official Ukrainian sources claimed that more than 13,500 Russians had been killed. By contrast, Moscow had earlier claimed only ~500. The Conflict Intelligence Team (CIT), an independent monitoring group based in Russia, estimated Russia’s military dead as ~700 at the time based on their investigations, but also speculated that a complete number might fall between 1,000 and 2,000.
During the week of March 6, one US official put the number of Russian fatalities as high as 6,000, but thought the number could be closer to 3,500. Also that week in testimony before members of the US House of Representatives, the director of the US Defense Intelligence Agency said the best estimate of Russian fatalities was between 2,000 and 4,000, although he also admitted low confidence in the estimate “because it relied on both intelligence sources and ‘open source’ information.” Clearly these US estimates of Russian fatalities range widely. One certainty, however, is that none comport with the estimates offered by either Moscow or Kyiv.
On March 13, President Zelensky claimed that the Ukrainian military had suffered around 1,300 fatalities. Earlier in March Russia estimated that its military operation had killed 2,870 Ukrainian troops. US officials have estimated that between 2,000 and 4,000 Ukrainian soldiers have been killed.
Confirmed civilian fatalities as of March 19 have been less: ~902 dead, according to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. However, the UN office also asserts that the number is surely an under count. (And with Russia having commenced heavier urban assaults in mid-March, the number might climb rapidly.)
Russian equipment losses
Turning to Russian equipment losses: In a March 15 report, the Ukrainian military claimed to have destroyed 81 Russian fixed-wing aircraft and 95 helicopters. It also claimed to have captured or destroyed 404 tanks and 1,279 armored personnel vehicles. Reports verified via online photographs tell a different story.
Independently documented Russian equipment losses amount to only half the number claimed four days earlier by the Ukrainian military for armored combat vehicles and only one-fourth the claimed aircraft losses. As of March 19, independent researchers logged the following Russian military losses:
109 tanks destroyed. Another 154 otherwise damaged, abandoned or captured;
225 fighting vehicles, APCs*, and MRAP** vehicles destroyed. Another 281 otherwise removed from Russian service;
14 aircraft destroyed, 1 damaged; 14 of these were combat aircraft;
29 helicopters destroyed, 5 otherwise out of commission.
[*Armored Personnel Carriers, ** MRAP: Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle]
How reliable are these figures? All claims derive from readily available photographic evidence exhaustively linked on the report’s website, which is commendable. The researchers claim efforts to ensure that the photographs are current, related to the Ukraine conflict, and correctly assigned to the appropriate party. And the photos can be reverse searched to aid in their verification.
Under-counting is more likely than over-counting. Although thousands of citizens and soldiers are deluging social media with photo documentation of the war, it’s likely that some disabled or abandoned Russian equipment has not been recorded due to the lingering presence of Russian troops. Also, Russian troops may have carted some away.
A summary of the combat vehicle and aircraft assets that Russia and Belarus brought to the theater can help put estimated losses in context:
1800-2000 tanks by various estimates (links are below)
Up to 8000 other armored combat vehicles (links are below)
300-500 combat aircraft at hand by varying estimates
The source of these baseline estimates are western military and intelligence agencies, diplomatic institutions, security policy centers, and trade and other media. Based on these sources, final ground equipment totals were extrapolated from the Pentagon assessed presence of 117 Russian Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs) as well as other unit types and higher levels of organization.
Viewing the observed losses in light these figures suggests a Russian ground equipment loss rate of approximately eight percent over four weeks. Russian combat aircraft losses were less. They have been within the 3-4 percent range. which corresponds with the sense that Russian air power has been underutilized.
It’s difficult to estimate combat activity based on such losses, which include equipment destroyed, disabled, abandoned, and captured. We know that the Russian effort has been plagued by severe logistical problems involving equipment repair and the provision of food and fuel. This might prompt soldiers to not only abandon equipment – which is occurring, in fact – but also to disable or destroy it to prevent its appropriation by Ukrainian forces. (The United States armed forces often did the same when leaving behind equipment in Afghanistan and Iraq.)
What might Russian material losses say about personnel attrition?
Whatever the exact proportion, eight percent of Russian equipment destroyed disabled, or otherwise lost within a period of four weeks is a great deal. The percentage of armored combat vehicles recorded as actually destroyed is ~3.35%.
Equipment losses do not necessarily correlate with personnel losses, nor are all losses the result of combat, but what we’ve seen would be consistent with 3,000 Russian dead and as many or more seriously injured. This assumes that 100,000 troops are forward in 100 Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs) and other formations with the remainder in support or reserve. This, in turn, is consistent with Ukrainian claims of as many as 1,000 POWs. (On March 12, the Ukrainian armed forces claimed to be holding 500-600 Russian POWs. President Zelensky was later reported to claim “almost” 1,000 POWs.)
For historical context, units suffering logistics, morale, or leadership problems can disintegrate if they suddenly suffer as little as 15% serious casualties. In the 1990-1991 Gulf War, Iraqi ground units, disintegrated after suffering as little as 2.5% fatalities. And this would generate large amounts of destroyed, disabled, abandoned, and captured equipment.
Ukrainian equipment losses
Drawing on the same source for a verified accounting of Ukrainian equipment losses shows, as of 20 March:
23 tanks destroyed, 42 otherwise abandoned or captured;
39 armored fighting vehicles and APCs destroyed. 84 otherwise abandoned or captured;
11 aircraft destroyed; 10 of these are combat aircraft.
As in the case of counting Russian losses, an undercount is more likely than an over count, both because lost equipment may lie in Russian controlled areas and because Ukrainian photographers and web masters may self-censor.
As best can be determined from other sources, the prewar Ukrainian arsenal included:
~850 usable tanks of varying age and capability
~2,400 infantry fighting vehicles and APCs
~80 combat aircraft – presumably not all of these are usable
Based on these estimates, the war has consumed about 5.8% of Ukraine’s available tanks and other armored combat vehicles. This rate is 83% as high as that calculated for Russian forces, which is not so much less. The percentage of Ukrainian aircraft losses has been significantly greater – 12% compared with 3-4 % on the Russian side. Also, keep in mind that the percentage of Ukrainian aircraft holdings that are actually functional is uncertain. One recent report asserts that Ukraine now holds only 56 functional fighter aircraft. This and combat attrition may explain Kyiv’s insistent requests for replacement aircraft.
Conclusion
Unsurprisingly, Moscow and Kyiv are far apart in their estimation of own and other losses. This testifies to the information or propaganda aspects of the current conflict. Independent sources of equipment losses show the two sides much closer in their levels of attrition than most media coverage would suggest. And this implies lower levels of personnel attrition. Interestingly, the levels of verifiable equipment loss are consistent with the lower range of US official estimates for Russian personnel losses: approximately ~3,000.
Ukrainian resistance is more intense than Moscow anticipated, but Russia’s principal problems are logistical and the impact of logistical shortcomings on morale. Although Russia’s home-based material stores are great, its forces are operating at the end of ever longer and more vulnerable supply lines. By contrast, Ukrainian forces are heavily dependent on uncertain outside support, but when its units are forced back they fall back on their supply lines.
The utter dependence of Ukraine on outside support drives its investment in the propaganda war, whose target is the West. By contrast, Russia’s propaganda efforts are oriented toward maintaining troop morale and Russian public support.
The key conclusion of our analysis is that, contrary to the propaganda messaging of the two sides, both would seem able to sustain combat for a considerable time longer. And this implies unrelenting destruction in Ukraine, with ever mounting civilian losses. While this might argue for increased emphasis on war containment and diplomatic efforts, the most evocative messaging on the western side emphasizes Russian miscalculation and fumbling, Ukraine’s adept resistance, and the promise of war termination via increased investment in the war.
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Originally Posted by Empty_of_Clouds
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